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Managing emergency situations in Republic of Serbia - Qualitative Aspect*

***Abstract:** Research within the European project of analyzing crisis management in European countries aimed, among other things, to question the qualitative dimension of new emergency management system in Serbia. In accordance with a particularly developed methodological framework, quality of this system was assessed in terms of its efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy, based on the data gathered conducting interviews with key decision makers and secondary source analysis. The fact that the system has been in existence for only two and a half years and that it still does not work at full capacity, since it has not been completed in a normative and institutional sense, makes any attempt of serious analysis and its evaluation difficult and problematic. Nevertheless, some general remarks can be made. The system has been tested practically in the events of several natural disasters and one technological disaster. The general assessment is that, given the fact that it is not fully completed, it functioned relatively well. Recurrence of similar technological accidents like fires in night clubs, indicates the inability of the system to properly determine liability, draw lessons and translate them into standard operating policies and procedures. Procedures for determining the professional and legal accountability are complicated and take a long time so the sanctions are not effective, while due to the overall constellation of political relations political accountability is minor.*

***Key words:** crisis management, Serbia, efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy*

Introduction

After almost two decades of rather unregulated responsibilities of particular ministries and bodies and outdated legislation, and lack of political will to regulate this area, the current Serbian civil security system¹ has been

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¹ In this paper we will use terms civil security system, crisis management and emergency management as synonymous.

established only in December 2009 when the Law on Emergency Situations (LES) was adopted in Parliament. This law is the basis for guiding all crisis management activities in the country. The Sector for Emergency Management (SEM) is recognized as a single body within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) where all emergency services from MOI, Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Environment are integrated (Bojičić, 2013:170,171). Therefore, the crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian operations and bodies, while military capabilities are only being employed upon request of the SEM, when other resources are not sufficient. Based on this law, Serbia takes mainly an all hazards approach with elements of a specific threats approach .

The general intention was to design a comprehensive decentralised system around the Sector of Emergency Management of the Ministry of Interior as the main pillar and integrator of different actors and to link professional agencies and political representatives on all levels of government in emergency management headquarters with precise delineation of mandate and responsibilities. A crisis is prepared for and resolved where it happens, that is primarily at the local level. If it exceeds the capacity of the local community, up scaling occurs on the higher levels of government up to the national level in cases of large scale disasters, including the engagement of the police and army if necessary.

Crisis² is defined in Article 7 of the Law on Emergency Situations (LES) as “a situation when risks and threats or consequences of catastrophes, emergencies and other threats to population, environment and material goods, are of such scale and intensity that their occurrence or consequences cannot be prevented or eliminated through regular activity of competent agencies and services, and for the mitigation or elimination of which special measures, forces and means at higher operational regime are required.”³ (Law on Emergency Situations, a.7, Official Gazette RS, 111/10).

This paper presents the findings on qualitative assessment of the new crisis management system in Serbia that are result of the research project Analysis of civil security systems⁴ in Europe (ANVIL) done within European Commission FP7 Framework. The overall aim of ANVIL project is based on understanding that civil security (or crisis management) systems in Europe display a wide variation in structures, policies, rules and practices: countries have differently their efforts to protect citizens from a variety of threats and ensure their security and safety. Each system evolved in a unique historical and

² Generic legal term is emergency situation. Besides this more specific terms are natural hazard, technical and technological hazard - accident, disaster and emergency also used and explained in LES.

³ The English version of LES. Translated by MOI.

⁴ Civil security systems are defined broadly as the national apparatus (policies, bodies, and mechanisms) designed to protect against new and urgent threats to the security of people and/or the functioning of critical infrastructures.

cultural context. Each is bound by different legal/constitutional frameworks. Each system consists of different actors and is governed differently. Each system has different relations with private sector parties. And each system relates to its citizens in unique ways. This project draws together existing data and collects additional information where necessary to map the variety and similarities in Europe's regional civil security structures, practices and cultures. It investigates if, and to what extent, variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens (for better or worse). In doing so, our results give policy stakeholders a clear view of which kind of systems could successfully enhance the security in certain regions. Finally, by including policy stakeholders in all phases of the analysis process, the project contributes to and gives EU-added value to the debate concerning "not one security fits all". (ANVIL, 2012)

Methodology - Quality measures

Within the ANVIL Mapping protocol a crucial question is how we can measure the quality of crisis management system is defined in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.⁵ The ANVIL Project takes an inductive approach towards the understanding of quality. Therefore, civil security systems will be gauged as effective, efficient and legitimate as far as politicians, professionals and citizens in the countries studied deem them as such. Data are collected using secondary data sources and interviews with relevant stakeholders.

Effectiveness is understood as the extent to which civil security systems are capable of producing reasonable results. In that sense main descriptive data refers to professional and political inquiries that have been carried out in the aftermath of major crises and limits to national capacities (calls for international assistance and declaration of State of Emergency)

Efficiency is understood in terms of value-for-money or cost-benefit analysis, i.e. the extent to which there is a reasonable balance between capacities at hand and their costs. In a comparative context, efficiency is ideally measured in terms of expenditures. However, emergency management sector costs are often highly fragmented, being allocated to a variety of functional areas (i.e. transportation, health care, infrastructure, police/intelligence, environment etc.) across different administrative or geographical levels (local, regional, national) and to different actors (ministries, special agencies, NGOs, private

⁵ In defining quality, we should keep in mind that different systems can be equally effective. What risks a nation should prepare for differ per country or region. In recent years, we have seen forest fires in Southern Europe, massive earthquakes in Italy, flooding in Eastern Europe, terrorist attacks in the UK, Spain and Norway, and infrastructure failures in Scandinavia (to name but a few recent events). In response to different crises, and shaped by different administrative traditions, risk cultures and legal constraints, different systems have evolved.

companies etc). In this context, the ANVIL Project gather budget/expenditure data, fully aware that their use for comparative purposes must be treated with care. Moreover, in an attempt to analyze efficiency, the Project looks into the issue of efficiency in terms of the degree to which the countries have initiated reform plans from a cost-saving perspective.

Legitimacy of crisis management system is understood in context of political support (major criticism on the system, or existing controversies regarding elements of the system, political reactions and major reforms), legal support (Ombudsman cases - if any crisis preparation/response laws and/or actions has been brought in to the ombudsman; legal cases - if crisis preparation/response laws and/or actions has been legally challenged in national courts; and human rights and civil liberties - to what extent are basic human rights and civil liberties built into the civil security system) and popular/public trust and support (public perception and voluntary engagement).

Findings

We will briefly present the key findings about the quality of Serbian system of crisis management understood in three dimensions: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.

Effectiveness - Assessment through professional and political inquiries

Political inquiries

In the period of 2000-2012 there was only one major political inquiry in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić. Besides the police and court investigation, a special Commission (“Korać`s Commission”) was formed with the task of examining the system of protection of the prime minister. The Commission found a number of failures in the work of the judiciary and serious lapses in personnel, organizational and technical aspects in the system of providing security of the Prime Minister and Serbian Government building.⁶ Only four lower level professionals in the police and security agencies were on call of duty. Court process against 44 persons charged with the assassination lasted for four years and they were sentenced to a total of 378 years. Investigation of the political background of the assassination is still going on.

⁶ Political background of assassination was not within the mandate of the Commission. The Commission for examining of system of protection of Prime Minister of Serbian Government Zoran Djidjic, PhD (2003).

Hardly any lessons were learned from this signature crisis.⁷ Some improvements have been made in technical equipment for protection and selection, recruitment and training of the staff responsible for the security of high state officials. However, the system is not very clear and precise so the president and/or prime minister are free to choose which civil or military agency will be responsible for their personal protection, on the basis of subjective assessment and their own trust in certain institution or individuals (Interview with a key respondent from the Commission).

Professional inquiries

In the aftermath of a national crisis, professional inquiries and reports are being made and discussed within Ministry of Interior/Sector for Emergency Management or National Emergency Management Headquarters, and later on submitted to the local/provincial/national government. Usually they are not followed by any public or parliamentary debate. Analyses are partial, from a viewpoint of a particular agency, and with no comprehensive synthetic reports. They are usually not publically available, remaining within particular ministries or narrow circles of the professional public. Lessons learned are not easily transferred into rules, procedures and practice. (Interview key respondent from MOI). In general, crisis actors are in a certain way protected from responsibility in the Serbian political context with the fragile coalition governments.

If a crisis situation occurs in military facilities, the investigation is conducted by the Serbian Army and usually results are not available for the non-military actors. They sometimes might be long-lasting and inefficient. (The *Blic* daily, 2012).

In some crisis situations on the local level there have been professional debates and judiciary processes. Illustrative is the case of fire in the *Contrast* disco club in Novi Sad, in April of 2012 that killed six young people. This event triggered a series of public controversies since the facility was inadequate for the purpose and overcrowded. After eight months of prosecutorial investigation, the responsibility of authorities was not addressed, there were no tangible results and it was not determined who was to blame. At the same time bars that have been closed in a campaign manner are working again, the clubs are still burning torches, to make “fire” cocktails and everything is more or less the same as before that tragic event. Additional exits have not been made, the clubs are still overcrowded and it is questionable whether they have got fire equipment.

⁷ Within ANVIL project a “signature crisis” is defined as a major crisis that is kept as a central feature of the collective memory of the state’s citizens. Typical examples of signature crises are the Utoeya/Norway bombings of 2011, the 1994 Estonia ferry accident, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

Reporters got no answers on these questions from the SEM. The father of one of the dead girls launched an initiative to amend the three laws concerning the registration of nightclubs and restaurants, as well as the adoption of the Rules of fire protection for this kind of facility (“Tamara’s Act”) to put an end to the bad practice of registering the night clubs before they meet fire protection measures. He said that nothing concrete has been done and that he will continue to struggle because they do not want any more afflicted families. The public prosecutor has launched an investigation against the owner, two tenants and an electrician, and at the request of defence counsel, the trial was postponed before it started. Parents of the victims believe that the responsibility should be looked for also in the relevant inspections - construction and tourism, and the Sector for Emergency Management for inadequate inspection and intervention. (Stepanov, 2012).

Limits to national capacities

Serbia formally requested assistance from the Russian Federation in 2007 in case of forest fire. Ever since, each summer Russian special airplanes and crews arrive at the Centre for the emergency situations in Niš as a preventive system back-up support in accordance with the bilateral agreement. This assistance is humanitarian in nature and free of charge. The main reason for such assistance is insufficient capacities, as Serbia does not have this kind of equipment. (Interview key respondent from MOI)

A *State of Emergency* was declared one time in the period of 2000-2012, in 2003 after the assassination of the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić that destabilized the government. As Serbian legislation was too liberal (in terms of police powers, duration of detention etc), the state of emergency was introduced in order to make necessary constitutional changes and amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Prosecutions that would enable the police to effectively prosecute the offenders. The government mounted Operation Saber (“Sablja”), the police action aimed at finding the assassins and striking a serious blow to organized crime. However, a number of political opponents to the Democratic Party and its government were arrested during this action in connection with organized criminal groups. Most were later freed. At the end of the operation, most of the suspects for the assassination were arrested (Vasić, 2005). The state of emergency lasted for 40 days (12.3. – 22.4. 2003) and was revoked by the Government after the adoption of necessary legal changes.

Introducing the state of emergency was the signal that the whole criminal justice system was not able to combat organized crime and it significantly contributed to improving the legislation and reform of the security sector.

The *Emergency situation* on national level was declared only once in February 2012 due to extreme weather conditions. No significant improvements in coping with extreme weather conditions have been made so far. In a similar situation in December 2012 the actions undertaken by responsible actors were not adequate and in a timely manner.⁸ Due to the collapse in the road transport network that was created in December 2012 by heavy snowfall, the prime minister criticized the minister in charge, while the representatives of Public Enterprise “Roads of Serbia” claimed they did their job responsibly and that the blame for the current situation is on unscrupulous drivers of heavy vehicles that are speeding and driving without adequate winter equipment and creating traffic jams. They also criticized the “competent authorities” (not explicitly mentioning Ministry of Transport) for not having prohibited cargo traffic on the most critical sections until crews could clear them up and the weather allows for cargo traffic to proceed. It was not specified who the “competent authorities” were, nor explained how the cooperation between the Republic Hydro meteorological Service, Public Enterprise “Roads of Serbia”, Traffic police and MOI was functioning in practice (Galović, 2012).

Efficiency

It is very hard to apply the concept of efficiency on the Serbian civil security system. Before the adoption of LES there was no particular budget for crisis management, and annual expenditures for this purpose, from the budget of MOI, were only around 50,000 euro, while costs of crisis situations were covered from budget reserves on an ad hoc basis. When the national budget is tight and there is extreme pressure for critical resources, expending funds or distribution of funds for contingency requirements is a difficult choice, so providing the funding to respond to a disaster was for decades considered an *ad-hoc* requirement to be dealt with at the time of the emergency. Actually the only major investment in crisis management before adoption of the e LES was in 2007 when € 12.8 million from the National Investment Plan was spent on purchase of vehicles for firefighters (Interview key respondent in MOI).

LES designated the following funding sources for crisis management:

- Budget (national/provincial/local)
- Fund for emergency situations, and
- Other sources specified in LES and other laws

It is not possible to present total expenditures for crisis management as there are no comprehensive data. The budget of the Republic of Serbia

⁸ One of the reasons is that the Republic transferred the road maintenance responsibility to the municipalities, but failed to carry out the transfer of funds for this purpose. In addition, some municipalities have signed contracts for road maintenance with companies that have gone bankrupt.

shall provide funds for the permanent budget reserve, which is used to finance expenditures for participation in eliminating the consequences of emergencies.⁹

The permanent Reserve is up to 0.5% of total revenues and income from the sale of non-financial assets for the fiscal year. The Government decides on use of the permanent budget reserve, at the proposal of the Minister of Finance. Besides this, the municipality/province is required to determine its budget funds for maintenance of the system as well as provisions for elimination of consequences of emergencies.¹⁰ When the municipal/provincial fund is not sufficient for elimination of consequences of emergencies, then, in accordance with the criteria established by a government decree, funds from Republican budget reserves are transferred.

The Newly established Fund for emergency situations is aimed at the construction and maintenance of the civil security system. In the beginning, the fund will be used for necessary building and equipping of the system in accordance with the planned priorities, while later on all the crisis management actors will apply with their projects for these funds. (Interview key respondent MOI). In 2011, the fund disposed of 5 million, in 2012 -10 million¹¹, and €15 million are planned for 2013.

Serbia is still considered a country of “nonconsolidated democracy” with a number of political and social tensions (Vujačić, 2009), so the question of efficiency in disasters is more complicated. Questions of budget on each level of governance are very important. Resources set aside for this purpose were utterly insufficient, so that the Serbian President after the flood in Trgovište in 2010 said that “funding for emergencies must be provided in the budget.” Regardless of official statements, there is no money for this purpose and financing is purely reactive, without investments in prevention and mitigation. (Radović & Jovanović, 2011). The efficacy of the Serbian crisis management system will be possible to question only once its funding is stabilized and its most basic needs satisfied, having in mind that for a number of years not even minimum funds were invested in it.

Legitimacy and political support

The legacy of the authoritarian rule, sanctions and political crisis in 1990’s, as well as the lack of democratic and parliamentary traditions and the basic consensus among the parliamentary parties on key social goals and values and how to solve the major problems of society have resulted in

⁹ For this purpose around €14 million is planned in 2013.

¹⁰ In SEM there are no centralized data of the total amount of these funds.

¹¹ Serbian budget for 2012 around €8.5 billion.

slow progress in building a democratic and stable social institutions. Due to huge program differences among members of the ruling coalitions, there was no stable parliamentary majority and only one government since 2000 that lasted a full mandate which made it difficult to implement social reforms. The greatest responsibility lies on the leadership of political parties whose narrow party, group and personal interests and the struggle for political power and money, are „mirrored“ in the lives of all social institutions. So, instead of democracy, Serbia has a partocracy, a de facto unconstitutional dominance of political parties over constitutional and governmental agencies and institutions (Vučićić, 2008).

In such a political context it took almost two decades for political actors to understand the importance of crisis management and to reach a basic consensus on fundamentals of the current civil security system. The adoption of LES was preceded by several expert discussions, while the enactment in the Parliament passed without major controversies. Nowadays there is a general political support of key players for building a new system (Interview key respondent MOI). However, political actors sometimes see the crisis as an opportunity for self-promotion and scoring political points, or denouncing political opponents.¹² Political interests and assessments sometimes have an impact on the functioning local emergency management HQ more that professional reasons. (Interview City of Belgrade EMHQ)¹³

Since the establishment of the new system of civil security there have been no major criticisms and no political consequences for political representatives that relate to crisis management. Just in one case, due to the inadequate reaction of local government in the town of Trgovište, during the floods in May 2010, the entire municipal leadership was forced to resign three months later (Veljković, 2010).¹⁴ However, the problem related to the decades of neglecting of systematic measures for flood prevention.

In the period of 2010-2012 there were only eight parliamentarian questions related to emergency management. Most of them were about the

¹² After the earthquake in Kraljevo representatives of the city opposition accused the government of irregularities in the allocation of funds for the (re)construction and asked for a detailed report. The mayor said that, “since the special account was opened, daily reports on inflow and expenditure of funds are published on the City’s website and urged police and prosecutors to check all the charges, saying that those are irresponsible and baseless accusations in order to collect political points See: <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/240950/Ukinuta-vanredna-situacija-posle-zemljotresa-u-Kraljevu>

¹³ Sometimes, a commander of EMHQ on local level can be a member of one party, and the Minister of Interior, to whom the head of SEM is responsible, can be a member of another party. Those political parties can have different interests and perception when it comes to the managing of a particular crisis. In this kind of conflicts, usually the more powerful political party will determine the course of action.

¹⁴ The question of accountability for the crisis in the Serbian context is slightly peculiar, taking into account that after the disintegration of SFRY, followed by three wars and 500.000 refugees and IDPs, economic sanctions and isolation, the highest inflation in the history of mankind, the armed uprising on Kosovo and the NATO bombing, citizens of Serbia have somewhat grown accustomed to crises.

compensation of damages from natural disasters and none of them was answered by the Minister of interior, but by the Prime Minister or other ministers) or the answer was postponed. (Parliament, 2011) Only one question was about addressing the responsibility for the damage caused by storm and hail and reorganization of hail protection service.

Legitimacy and legal support

There have been several complaints to the Serbian Ombudsman related to natural disasters. Despite the fact that the Law on Using Funds for Restoration and Protection from Natural Disasters is in force, people who are affected by natural disasters face many problems. As regards large-scale damages, for which the state and/or local self-government have allocated a certain amount of funds to help the affected citizens, the following problems occur: a lack of regulations setting the terms, procedures and criteria for determining the order for awarding the funds for restoration of damage (ranking); the absence of a body authorised to decide on objections/appeals filed against the decisions of competent authorities; the absence of a body authorised to control the use of funds allocated for the elimination of consequences of natural disasters.

The citizens who have suffered smaller scale damages face different problems. According to the views of the competent judicial and administrative authorities, they usually cannot expect the state to participate in restoring the damage caused by natural disasters.¹⁵ When they receive a decision from the relevant city or municipal inspection on the prohibition of using a damaged residential building, in practice they are often provided with temporary accommodation for a short period, and then the local self-government informs them that there are no funds in its budget earmarked for repairing the damage or constructing a new residential building, after which they are left on their own.

The situation in this field is additionally complicated by the fact that the Government and the competent minister (MOI) were obliged to adopt more detailed regulations for the implementation of the said Law within six months of its entry into force, which, according to the available information, has not

¹⁵ In the procedure of citizen complaints, the Ministry of Environment, Mining and Spatial Planning expressed its view that the mere fact of the damage caused by natural disasters and its assessment by the authorised commission did not produce an obligation of a public authority to compensate for and restore the damage, bearing in mind that the damage had been the result of circumstances that could not be predicted. This attitude was also articulated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia Rev. No.2241/2007 of 11 September 2008, stating that when the damage was caused by the so-called *force majeure*, the effects of which could not be predicted, the rule on exemption from liability was generally applicable. However, when the *force majeure* causes large scale damage affecting more people, then the state intervenes and commits itself and its institutions to secure all or part of the funds for eliminating the harmful consequences according to the principle of solidarity.

been done (Protector of Citizens, 2011: 131-135).

LES provides equal protection for all citizens in crisis situations. In addition, National Strategy for Protection and Rescue in Emergencies (NSPRE) insists on paying special attention to the training of all agents of crisis management in order to provide appropriate assistance and protection of vulnerable social groups / children, elderly and persons with disabilities in natural and other disasters

Popular trust and support

In general, the level of trust in institutions in Serbia is low, as presented in the following table

Table 1: *Trust in institutions (%)*, Source CeSID, 2011.

	Do not know	No trust	Neither have nor have not	Have trust	Total
Church	4	19	18	59	100
Police/Police officers	2	25	28	45	100
Army/Soldiers	7	21	28	44	100
MOI	2	26	30	42	100
Educational system	4	28	28	40	100
Health system	1	36	26	37	100
MOD	7	28	32	33	100
Local government	4	42	29	25	100
Serbian Government	3	47	30	20	100
Judiciary	4	52	26	18	100
Citizens associations	10	43	29	18	100
Parliament	3	53	28	16	100
Political Parties	4	66	21	9	100

There are no particular surveys on trust in institutions of civil security systems, but the presented data show that trust in the police, MOI and MOD, as important actors of crisis management, is higher than for all other institutions except the church.

There are no particular data on trust in SEM, and data for the MOI cannot be mechanically transferred to SEM. However, some conclusions can

be drawn indirectly. People in Serbia usually perceive institutions through their leaders. So the SEM is perceived through its Head, Mr. Predrag Marić who is often in the media, trying to raise awareness, explain problems and emphasize the importance of crisis preparedness and sharing responsibility in this area. For his work he got several local (person of the year in capital Belgrade) and international (French medal of knight) awards, so SEM efforts are recognized and appreciated by the community (Interview key respondent MOI).

Conclusion

After two decades of legal vacuum, organizational and institutional confusion resulting from the collapse of the civil security system adapted to the socialist society and the lack of elementary responsibility and vision of political leadership, Serbia in 2010 set up a normative/legal basis for the construction of a new civil security system.

When designing the new system and making the law, comparative experiences, historical background, capabilities and capacities of the country and its prospects of EU integration, as well as the current political constellation were taken into account. The professional community has positively assessed the legal text. Normative regulation of the system is almost completed, but the passage of national laws is not a sufficient response. However it puts the government in a better position as having addressed the problem and laid the foundation for a national response capability. The implementation or enforcement phase is facing a number of problems such as insufficient resources available and problems related to creation of other organizational, personnel and material and technical conditions for its successful implementation.

There is a growing recognition that disaster prevention and emergency response must be one of the government's priorities. Although general political consensus on the importance of the civil security system has been achieved, there remains a reflection of existing political divisions and interests on professional performance, as well as an underlying political calculus in all phases of crisis management, when political actors are more preoccupied with their ratings, than with the wellbeing of the citizens. Relations between the state and civil society actors are not precisely defined, and they are dependant on personal relations among people in institutions. Like in most of the South Eastern Europe countries there is significant room for national and multilateral initiatives to improve public awareness and involvement in disaster preparedness efforts (DPPI, 2001).

The fact that the system has been in existence for only two and a half years and it is still not working at full capacity, since it is not completed in a normative and institutional sense, makes any attempt of serious analysis and its

evaluation difficult and problematic. Nevertheless, some general remarks can be made. In NSPRE it is stated that the current level of organization and capability of system of civil security in Serbia is significantly behind the assessed needs and objective possibilities of the state. There is a need for technical innovation and equipping, as well as for improving and modernisation of infrastructure, of informational-communication systems in accordance with EU standards. The statistical data in Serbia show insufficient capacity of the society to respond to the present challenges, risks and threats in an adequate way, which results in material and non-material damage, both at the level of commercial entities and at the state level (Keković, Marić, and Komazec, 2011). Prevention seems to be the weakest point, together with the fact that in some parts of the Serbian population there are no traces of awareness and responsibility for safety. There are also problems related to the harmonization of different organizational cultures of staff co-opted in SEM and overcoming the divisions between “us” and “them” (Interview key respondent MOI).¹⁶

The most important gaps outlined in NSPRE relate to *institutional organization* (lack of conditions for the consistent application of regulations, inadequate organization and implementation of preventive measures, lack of specialized cadastres, comprehensive risk maps, methodology for hazardous waste management, 112 system, uneven distribution of capacities of the emergency response services in the RS), *material – technical* (unsatisfactory level of road and other infrastructure, outdated, unreliable equipment, facilities and vehicles of the emergency response services, lack of specialized vehicles and equipment for responding to chemical accidents in road, rail and river transport etc.), *cooperation, coordination and availability of information* (insufficient coordination between protection and rescue system entities in emergency situations, between scientific and research institutions and direct beneficiaries of researches, with NGOs and the private sector and international cooperation), *human resources and capacity building* (inadequate professional qualification and technological discipline of the available human resources, lack of specialized personnel, insufficient training, unpreparedness and a low level of the local self-government capacity and underdeveloped culture of prevention).

The system has been tested practically in several natural disasters (floods, extreme temperatures and earthquake) and in one technological disaster. The general assessment is that, given the fact that it is not fully completed, it functioned relatively well.¹⁷ The system proved relatively successful in a crisis situation caused by a snow storm in February 2012, but in a similar situation

¹⁶ This refers to the employees of the MOD (an institution with military organizational culture) who were incorporated in the MOI.

¹⁷ It can be stated that it functioned significantly better than in a similar situation before the introduction of the new system.

in December 2012, reacted poorly. Recurrence of similar technological accidents (fires in night clubs) indicates the inability of the system to properly determine liability, draw lessons and translate them into standard operating policies and procedures. Procedures for determining the professional and legal accountability are complicated and take a long time so the sanctions are not effective, while due to the overall constellation of political relations political accountability is minor. It seems that, due to the lack of financing and political environment it is very hard to apply the concept of efficiency on the Serbian civil security system. It will be in the focus of decision makers only once its funding is stabilized and its most basic needs satisfied.

Development and completion of the system will depend on material and technical requirements, support of political actors and enthusiasm of the professionals in SEM and in other institutions responsible for crisis management.

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Управљање ванредним ситуацијама у Републици Србији – квалитативни аспект*

***Апстракт:** Истраживање у оквиру европског пројекта испитивања кризног менаџмента у европским земљама је, поред осталог, имало за циљ да испита и квалитативну димензију новог система за управљање ванредним ситуацијама у Републици Србији. У складу са посебно развијеним методолошким оквиром, квалитет система је испитиван кроз његову ефикасност, ефективност и легитимност, а на основу интервјуа са кључним доносиоцима одлука и анализе секундарних извора. Чињеница да нови систем постоји тек нешто више од две и по године и да још увек не функционише пуним капацитетом, будући да није сасвим компетиран у нормативном и институционалном смислу, чини сваки покушај његове озбиљне анализе тежким и проблематичним. Ипак, могуће је изнети нека општа запажања. Систем је практично тестиран у неколико природних и једној техничкој ванредној ситуацији и по општој оцени је функционисао релативно добро. Понављање сличних технолошких акцидентата, као што су пожарари у ноћним клубовима, показује неспособност система да на одговарајући начин адресира питање одговорности, да извуче поуке и преточи их у стандардне оперативне процедуре. Поступци утврђивања професионалне и законске одговорности су спори и компликовани, тако да санкције нису ефективне, док је, услед укупне констелације политичких односа, политичка одговорност актера минорна.*

***Кључне речи:** кризни менаџмент, Србија, ефикасност, ефективност, легитимност*

* Резултати објављени у раду су настали у оквиру истраживања финансираног од стране Седмог Оквирног Програма Европске уније FP7/2007-2013, у оквиру Уговора о донацији број 28467.